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has rendered, less the value of what he has received, unless
what he' bas rendered can be and is returned to him in specie
within a reasonable time...• "
Applying these rules to the facts shown in the present action, upon any failure of the company to perform the contract cimsed by the supervention of public regulation, justice
requires that it must compensate the appellant in the amouIit
of the value of the rIparian right taken from his predecessor
in interest, together with the value of the easement for the
maintenance of the water main until it was abandoned., .AB
a credit upon such amounts; the appellant' must· be charged
for the value of the benefits received by Lake and his successors in interest.
[6] The finding of the trial court, fully justified by the
record, that there is insufficient evidence from which it could
find that the· consideration for the Lake contract was adequate forecloses the appellant from sccuring the remedy of
specific performance. 'I.'he declaration of section 3391 of the
Civil Code that "Specific performance cannot be enfbrced
Ilgainst a party . . • if he has not received an adequate cori~
sideration for the contract,." makes adequacy of. considerationa prerequisite to the granting o:fsucli relief: (Corn.bUlh
v; Valentine, 21I Cal. 243 [294P. 1065] ;,O'Oonnell v. Lampe,
206 Cal, 282 [274 P. 336]; O'Hara v; Watts on, 172 Cal. 525
[157 P. 608]; Haddoekv~. Knapp~ 171C~1. ~9 [151 P. 114,0);
Morrison v; Land, 169.Cal. 580 [1471\ 25~1; Wilst.l1a v;
White, 161 CaL 453 [f19 P. 895J;. Nottenv. Mensing, 20 Cal.
App.2d 694 [67 P.2d 734] ; Kels6yV.San: 1J'~tnar/,do Develop~
ment 00., {ne., 124 Cal. App; 279'[12r:2g. 70];)
[7]. Nor is .the appella:!].t entitl~dtoi:i::tjunctiverelief. The
record discloses no, evidence. tliat· theresporident has refused
to deliver water to theappelIant hut onlytha(it,insists upon'
the payment of.a high!3r'rate thanthatpr~escribe<l by the COn~
tract. Until the contract rat.e is anntilledby the' Railroad
Commission, the appellant may secure ad¢quate. compensation
for the failure of the respondent to perform its obligations
under the contract by an action for damages.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Traynor, J., andPeters~
J. pro tem., concurred.
Carter, J., concurred In the judgment.
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. [L. A. No. 18302. In Bank. Oct. 2,1942.]

STATE OF OHIO exrel. S. Ii. SQUIRE, Superintendent of
Banlrs, etc., Respondent, v. CLARENCE H. PORTER,
Appellant.
.
[1] Limitation of Actions-Law Governing..,,;.;,The statute' of limi-

tations of the forum governs the, tinlefor the commencement
of an action arising- in another state.
[2] Banks-Stockholdcrs-Liability---Limltation.--A. bank stock...
holder's liabiHty for his proportionate share of'cbrPorate debts
is a liability creat~d by law within Code Civ. Proc.,§ 359.
[3] Corporations-Stockholders' Liability-Law Governing.-The .
full faith and credit clausl3 (U.S.Const., art. IV,§ 1) requires
that the time when a stockholder's lill.bilitywas created, within .
Code Civ. Proc., § 359, be dctel'Dlinedbythe law of the state'
of the corporation's domicile.
',.
[4] Banks-Stockholders-Liability-Limitation.--Thellabilityof..
a stockholder of a bank under tho Ohio law is' creatlld ¥thin
Code Civ.Proc., § 359, prcsCJ;ibing 'th~ ·time-for ~t, o~ 'the
dI!.Y.the. barikfails; nO,t the day ··.the·S.'upermtendent .0f)~~I!·
take.s possessIon, since the creditors can enforce the J.iabilitfo~
failtlre of the bank, and the statute givlng. th,e' superintendESn,t'
exclusive authority in.this respcrit fronl:..thetimc· he tli.k~s:p'~s4
session (Ohio Gen. Code, 710-95) does' -ti~t'sttbstit1ite 8!1i;:ew
liability.
. .
- "";'.'
...... ".;;lJ):,.:r
[5]

'.

-'

Id.-,Stockholders-LiabUitY-Limitati()¥~:A.nf; ~~tion} t~'~n¥

force Ii. bank stoc~oldlir'ssuperndiled'lit1~ility'~iie¥~:bh1o"
Const., art. XIII, §3, is nota '.suit.ou·an'·as'ScssnrentFonff-ltfJ .
enforce a liability that is direct, priniary .atldso~~e:xe'clil,t¥g•.
And to give effect to the 'Ohio lawdti· (tpplYing the: limita~'
period proscribed in Code CIv.l?roc.;§359;i~.no:ta Violation "
, ()f the privileges and immunity' elnuse of the .• U.S: COllstk(art
,IV,§ :a), although liability undcrthe.Cali~o~ ~~~!;~to~~~ ,
!Lolder~' Liability Act (Stat!l.1931,p.3a8-,Deerin~s.(lc~.~a~1
.19a7, Act 65~a) is regarded all (lrea.todwhen the ;ass~sflln~nfis .
,nls.de. C?de piv. ~ro<l., § 3.59? is .a,PPIle~ ..t,m,if~~yt9 ~o'Jnp'~i~
. the apphcable perIod of lUttltatloti f.Ol' the ;eommenc!'ement' bf
the actiotl from the cre.ation 'of ihe lili.bility; i ; ' . ';UT:
.....

.

'
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[1], See 160al. Jur.411; 11 Ani. Jur. 50~. .' .,
Mc:K.Dig.lteferences: [1] Lunitation of Actions;§ 16;
Bl!.nks,§ 44; [3] Corporations, § 494.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Reversed;
Action to enforce supcradded liability of stockholder of
Ohio bank. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
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Meserve, Mumper & Hughes, Roy L. Herndon and Charles
O. Parker for Appel1.1nt.
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Mathes & Sheppard, GordonF. Hampton, Einrys Davis,
Wm. C. Mathe-'l, Thomas J. Herbert, Attorney General
(Ohio), E. S. Lindemann, Special, Counsel to Attorney' Gen~
eral, E. J. Halambeck, Assistant Special Counsel to Attorney
General, and Paul M. Gregg for Respondent.
SHENK, J.:......The State of Ohio, on the relation ofS. H.
Squire, Superintendent of Banks in charge of liquidation of
The Union Trust Company of Cleveland,commenced, this
action on May 26, 1936, in Los Angeles County, to enforce
an alleged stockholders' liability against' the defendant. In
his answer the defendant raised the point that the cause of
action was barred by the provisions of section 359 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure. The case W8B tried on
stipulated fact'l, jUdgment was for plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
'
The Union Trust Company was a banking corporation. It
was organized and existed under the corporation and hanking laws of the State of Ohio. On February 27, 1933,. and
for some time prior thereto, the defendant was a stockholder
owning 560 shares of capital stock of the company, having a
par value of $25 per share. On the morning of that day,
the company was unable to mect its obligations in the regular course of business. Pursuant to a resolution of its
board of directors, but without statutory authority, it operated all that day on a so-called restricted bnsis in that it
refused to payout on demand more than 5 per cent of any
demand deposit or other matured obligation. On the evening of that day, the Ohio Legislature enacted a law, effective
immediately, authorizing the Superintendcnt of Banks to place
any banking institution on a restricted basis and to segregate
all deposits thereafter received. .Accordingly, the superintendent made such an order applicable to The Union Trust
Company. On April 8, 1933, the superintendent appointed a
conservator to take possession of the business and property
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of the bank~ The conservator' was in. posseSsion and con~~Rl
frotn that date until June 15, 1933, when .the superintendent
deel:tre~and determin~d. that thecotnpany ,wa~in, ari"~~ ,
sound and unsnfe condItIOn. He thereupon to~kp.os~es.s~()ll: '
for the purpose of liquidation. On July 30,1~3~" the, s~~~t~
intendant,after aUditing the affairs of the bari¥; .foUnd'rtli~t
the liabilities exeeeded the nssets in an amounfgreater "iliaD:
the stockholders' !'io-called superadded or , do,lble. liabilitY,.
On .August 1, 1934, the superintendent, caused notices' i&'
mailed to the stockholders; advising them that the ;rissets' weJ,'e
insufficient to dischar~e theliubilitiesnnd that:' h!l" intende4
to enforce the individual liability of the stockholders. H'e
advised each, stockholder of the amount' (lOOper, ~ent :assess~
ment)nnd demanded payment on or before November 1) 1934:
, [1] It is well nettled that the, statute, of limitations of
the forum ~overllS the time for the commencement of an
action arising in another state. (McElmoyle, :v~ Ooken, ~13
Pet. 312 [10 L.Ed. 177]; Great Western Telegraph Co. v,
Purdy, 162 U.S. 329 [16 S.Ot. 810, 40L.Ed. ,986]; Royal
Trust Co. v. MacBean, 168 Cal. 642 [144 P. i39].)
[2] AP. applied to the present controversy,section 359·of
the Cali~<?rnia Coue of Civil Procedure provides that an ac;.'
tion against a stockholder to enforce a liability' created by law
"must be brought within three years after ,~", . the liability
was created." The stockholder's liability for his proportionate share of the corporate indebtedness is 'a . "liability created by law" within the mcaningof this section. ' (Hunt v.
Ward, 99 Cal. 612 [34 P. 335, 37 Am.St.Rep. 87] ;' RichardsOn v. Craig, 11 Cal.2d 131 [77 P.2d 1077].) The:time when
the liability was created must be differentiated from the tiine
when the cause of action necrued; [3] To determine· when
the liability was created the full faith and, credit clause of
the United States Constitution (art. IV, § 1) 'requires recourse to the applicable constitutional provisions,'statutes and
decisions of Ohio. (Converse v. Hamilton,. 224 U.S. 234 [32
s.Ot. 415, 56 L.Ed. 749].)
.
[4] The stockholders' superadded or double.liability'w8B
imposed by article XIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution,
which provided that "stockholders of corporations authorized'
to receive money on deposit shall be held individually r('sponsible, equally and ratably, and not one foranothe'r, for all
contracts, debts, and engagements of such corporations, to
the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par
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vallie thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such
shares. " The liability WDS direct and self-executing, did' not
need legislation to make it ei'ft?cth'e, and created a primary
obligation against the stockhulder by operation of law.
(Squire v. Standen, 135 Ohio Bt. 1 [18 N~E.2d608, 120 A.L.R.
952] ; State v. Bremer, 130 OIlioSt. 227 [19S ~.E.87:4] ; ~ni~
der v. United Banking & Trust OO'Y/i,pany, 124 Ohio St. a75
[178 N.E. 840];' I-ang v. Osborn Bank, 100 Ohio St. 51 [125
N.E. 105].) However, the Ohio Le~islature
fit to enact
section 710-75 of the General Code ·of that statc. On Feb"
mary 27, 1933,when The Union Trust Company suspended
business, said section provided as follows:
"Stockholders of banks shall be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all
contracts, debts, and engagements of such bank, to the ~xtent
of the amount ,of their stock therein, at the par value thereof,
in addition to the amount invested in such shares. The stockholders in any bank who shall have transferred their shares
or registered the transfer thereof within sixty days neXt before the failure of such bank to mect its obligations, or with
knowledge of such impending failure, shall be liable to the
same extent as if they had madc no such transfer,. to the extent that the transferee fails to meet'such liability; ... At
any time after taking possession of a bank for the purpose
of liquidation, when the superintendcnt of banks ascertains
that the assets of such bank will be insufficient to pay its
debts and liabilities, he may enforce the individual liability
of the stockholders."
'
And on March 31, 1933, section 710-95 of the Ohio General Code wMamended to .read as follows:
"The superintendent of· banks, upon taking possession of
the business and property of any bank, shall have, exercise
and discharge the following powers, authority ,and duties,
without notice or approval of court, but subject t6the provisions of ,this chapter,towit: ...
"9. If he ascertains that the Msets of such bank will be
insufficient to pay its debts and ,liabilities, to' enforce, the in.
dividualliability of ,each sh:lreholder there6f'asp~ovidcd in
section 710-75 'of the General Code'.UntlIah order to declare and pay a final diVidend)hall b(!' entcred in the liquidation prbceedings the'l1ght to.enfo,rce stich iiability is hereby
vested exclilShrely in the 8uperirttcndent Of banks." '
"
The obviouS effect oIthisa.m~dincnt waS to lodge in the
superinterideIit of banks the exclusive authority to enforce

saw
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the stockholders' liability in cases where he, had taken p~~
'sessio;nof a bnnk fOl'the purpose of liquidation. (Fulton V.
WetzeZ, 47 Ohio App. 72 [190N.E.77,6]; lf~Zdmanv. Stan~
dard ,Trust Bank, 46 Ohio 1,\pp. 67 '[187 N.Ft~ ,743].) And
unde~ its provisions the SUperintendent ,could not l>rillg ,an
actiQIl to enforce the stockholders' liability UntU he had taken
possess!on :for the purpose or'liquidation. ','(SnUer v.' United
Banking and Trust 00" supra.) It i!!i the law of OhiQthat
when the superintendent of bankssrie~ toenfprce the' ~stbck'
holders' liability he represents the creditors (Feid.ma,n \1;
Standard Trust' Bank, supra), and that any statute Of'IJDl,itations which would bar an action by the creditor wou],d likewise bar an action brought by the superintendent of' banks
to enforce the ~uperadded liability. (State v. Bremer, supra.)
February 27, 1933, the day the bank failed to meet its
obligations in the ordinary course of business and limited
its paynlents to 5 per cent of any demand deposit or matured
obligatiori, marked the beginning of voluntary liquidation.
A cause of action was immediately created and acci'rued t()
th~ crcditors. At that time the superintendent of banks had
not taken possession for the purpose of liquidation, and his
action in that respect was the all-Important conditioli precedent to the enforcement of thestQckholders' liability. (Sni(ler
v~ 'United Banking & Trust Qompdny, supra.)H~ did not
take possession until June 15,1933. Dux:i;ng th~p~riod ,from
February 27 to June 15, ~933,the cr~,4i~ors,cq1ild.h~ve:en
forced the ,stockholders' liability.. (Snid~r:t. ;TJnitl!d' Ban~ing
& Trust Oompany,supra.)" Inasmttcha;s,the right o~ the
creditors to 'enforce that liability ha,daccl:'11~c:i, ~s ~a,rly as
February 27, 1933; the liabilityuponwh,icp:the Pl'i!$~lit~¢ti~n
was based certainly WM created at least as El"a.tJy, 'as ,th~ 'q,ate
the calise of. 'action aC!lrued. When on, if~~:'1.I): J~af,~he
superintendent tookposse~sio:p,of. t,he~a~~9rth.,n)iiqJose
of liquidation, the provisions 6fsectioll,7~O-9.5.' gi:yjD:g'the
superintendent the exclusiveright~9' ,ehfor~.'tli~Ua,bfliiY '
became operative ,and automaii!lally ,abf1ted,~ny ; rig~t, ~e~e1 '
t~forepossessed by thecreditoi'siQ;Cllf9r~., ~cll:U,abmtt,
including actjons pendingwhcn the~en,dmen;t to, $~tion
710-95 became effective. (FuZion v"Wetz~Z, ;47 Ohio' .A.pp;
72 [190 N. E. 7 7 6 ] . ) '
'
The statute giving thesuperinte'ndent,Qf banks the ex~
elusive authority after takin/t possessit!h to enfo!'c.e, the stockholders' liability did not substitu:t~ a new or diffel"elit liabil-
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:ity from that already existing, that is, it did not "uncreate"
an already created liability. The statute merely substituted
the superintendent of banks in place of the creditors in the
t'Iiforcement of the stockholrlers' liability. It is the settled
law of Ohio that the provisions of the General Code Ilections
inthis r~spect w(;re procedural and not substantive. (Snider
v.United Banking & Tru.st Oompany, supra; Squirv v. Bor.ton!i7 Borton (Solinski), 132 Ohio St. 180 [5 N.E.2d 479].)
Furthermore, the primary, direct and self-executing stockhold_
ers' Hability declared in thf' Ohio Constitution could not be
changcd by a proc~dural provision relating to the method
of. its enforcement.
Additional support is found in the decisions of Ohio for
the conclusion that the stockholders' liability was createn the
day the bank failed, namely, on February 27, 1933. In
Squire v. Harrls, 135 Ohio St. 449 [21 N.E.~d 463], a transferee of hank stock was held not subject to the superadded
liability where the transfer in question took place on the
same day but after tht' bank had ceased to receive money on
genqral df'posit. Also, it has been hdd that the 60-day period
preceding failure, prescribed in Ohio General Coue, section
710-75, during- which a transferor of bank stock remained
hable as surety for thf' transfrrf'e's liability, relat.t:d hack
t "om the day the bank fail ('d, and not from the nny the suI lrint<'l'ldent of banks took posscssion.
(Bailey v. St/#e,
lUrt of ApPf'als, Ohio, Cuyahogoa County, (Ohio App.) 32
E.2d 453.)
[5] The plaintiff contends that the suit is on the .. assessment"; that the "assessment" is It "publie act" within the
scope of. artic·le IV, section 1 of the federal Constitution and
must be accorded full f[lith and credit by thu courts of California; that !;line" the Ollio law and the National Bank Act
(U.S.C.A., title 12, § 21 et seq.) are similar, the deClslOns IlJvolving the Natiollal Bank Act to the effect that the suit is on
the" assessment" are controlling; that such result is in accord
with Richardson v. Oraig, 11 Ca1.2d 131 [77 P.2d 1077), which
holds that the liability is created at the time of the aR.Re!'sment; and that to give a different interpretation of the Oldo
law would be to violate article IV, scction 2 of the United
States Constitution, providin!!' that the· citizens of each state
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states.
The case of State v. Melaragno, 31 O.L.R. 627 (Court of
Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 1930), does Dot support the
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plaintiff's position that the present action must be deemed
to be on the assessment. In that case the court was applying
a statute of limitations which prescribed a .per~od c!>mmencin~ from the time the cause of action accrued, as distinguished
from the time the liability was created. Furtllermore"the
reasoning of that decision to the effect that the,liability, did
not accrue until thB assets of thebllllk we~e.,liquidl1:tedis
contlary to the established and admitted holdfng,ofthe Ohi9
Supreme Court that the stockholders' liability is 'direct,! pJ,'i~
mary and self-executing. It may be notedthat,itisnotne~.
essary in an action by the superintendent of banks iIi Ohio
to enforce the stockholders' liability that he even,allege that.
he has declared an assessment.
.
.
Other cases cited by the plaintiff do not support his p08i~
tion. They include: Squire V. Standen, supra; State v. Mur~
fey, Blossom &7 00., 131 Ohio St. 289 [2 N.E.2d 866] ; Vance
V. Warner, 129 Ohio St. 357 [195 N.E. 704]; State v. Oruik~.
shank, 51 Ohio App. 61 [199 N.E. 611]; Barumgardner v.
State, 48 Ohio App. 5 [192 N.E. 349]. In those cases the
courts of Ohio recognized that the liability which was enforced by' an assessment was the direct and p1,'imary. stockholders' liability, even though the necessity therefor and the
amount thereof be. determined exclusively and finally by the
fact and the amount of the assessment.
,,
The plaintiff's citation of numerous authorfiXes construing the National Bank Act and other actS similar.to the Ohio
statute is unavailing for the reason that we arc here boun,d
by the Ohio court's interpretation of the prOVIsions of the
Constitution and statutes of that state.
In the case of Richardson V. Oraig,l1 Ca1.2d 131 [77 P.2d
1077], this court held that the liability under tlie California
Bank Stockholders' Liability Act (Deering's Gen. Laws, Act
652a) was "created" when the assessment was made. This
holding could be considered only in the absence of c.onStruc~
tion by the courts of Ohio of its own fundamental and statutory laws. As we have seen, the Ohio courts have denominated the stockholders' liability direct, primary and se1£f'x~lmting, as distingouished from the indirect and secondary
stockholders' liability involved in the California decision.
Although the limitation of section 359 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure is applied in the same sense in both the
Hichnrdson case and the present case,namely, from the time
the liability was created, the different conclusions result froin
the all-important differences ill substantive law creating the
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rights Upon which suit Was brought. In. the, Richardson case
it'",11S recOA'Dized that if the stockholders' liability was. direct
and primary,as Undcr the earlier California law, the liability
would havc been created at the time the obligation was ,incurreq, and not at the time the aSsessment was levied,
To give proper effect to the Ohio law in this case obvi~
ously i.e; not a' Violation of the privileges ~d immunities
cla.use of the United States Constitution. The time limitation of said section 359 is applieduni:formly to compute the
applicable period of limitation for the commencement of the
action from the time the liability was created.
We therefore conclude that under the law of Ohio the
stockholders' liability here sought. to be enforced wascreated on the 27th day of Febru.ary, 1933; and that as the
action was not· brought within three years after that date
it is barred by section 359 of our Code of Civil Procedure.
The judgment is reversed.

.

Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., ,
concurred.

;!i
i:1

:~;
iI'

".(
!,

',i

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. Statutes of limitation are procedural statutes that operate to bar the remedy after a reasonable time for bringing suit upon an accrued cause of
action has elapsed. They are not intended to alter Or destroy
the substantive rights or liabilities involved. (See 34 Am,'
Jur. 15.) When enforcement is sought in the courts of one
state of a right created under the law of anot!J,er, the law
of the forum governs matters of procedure, including the
period of limitation imposed upon the. remedy. (Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 603, 604.) InVOking the general
rule with respect to statutes of limitation, the majority
opinion relies Upon the provisions of Code Qf Oivil Procedure, section 359, to bar suit Upon a bank stockholder's liability crell.ted under the laws. of the State of Ohio.
Section 359, While located in that part of the Code of Civil
Procedure dealing with statutes of limitation generally,is
no ordinary stat'llte 6f·lfuiitations. The section requires that
action..c:; against stockholders to en£orce a ljability created by
law be bro'llght "withW threc years after . . . the liability
was created." The threc-year period commences to run from
the date the liability is created, irre~pective of wh,en the
cause of action accrues, and the action inight be barred thereunder before any right to sue accrues. (Hunt V.Wa~d, 99

~,
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Ca1.61~ [3.4 P. 33~, 37 Am.St.Rep. 87] ; s¢e: 7 Cal.L;Rev. 346;)'
Thi"s statute; far from prescrib,iJlg' a reasonable . period. Within,
which. an accrued caus~ of lictioncan be ei1for.c~dbysuit,
actually d~1imit$ the '.liabiJity itself. Such . a- st~tu~,.' oper~
atihg ·to qualify certain rights· and liabilitiea create,d under
the laws of ~his state, should not be regarded as a procedural '
regulation ,of the forum with respect t9 actions' inVOlving,
the' enforcement of foreign rights and liabilities. Statutes
that do nof merely limit the remedy, but qualify' the right,
are treated as part of the substance of the obligation to be
determiped according to the law under which the obligation iscI-eated. (Davis v.Mills, 194 ns. 451 [24'S.Ct. 692,
48 L.Ed. 1067] ; Osborne v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 87 Vt; 104
[S8, A. 5).2. Ann.Cas. 19160.' 741 ;¢j. Central Vt. Ry. Co. v;:
White; 238 US. 507, 511 [35 S.Ct: 865, 59 L:Ed. 1433};- see
Restaten1:ertt, Conflict of Laws, § 605, comment a:; .34 Am.Jur:.
16; 28 Yale L.J. 492, 494.)
Section 359 may be applied for reasons of policy to qualify rights and liabilities arising under the laws of this state.
W1:ien ~he section was inc~uded in the .Code, of Civil Proce:'
dure in 1872 the Constitution of California providenthat'each
shareholder of a corporation was individually and personally liable for his proportion of all 'its debts arld liabilitie.s.
(Const. of 1849, art. IV, §36.) A similar provision was in ..
eorporated in the Constitution of 1879. {~ri.XII, § 3.} Thil'
liability not only worked hardship upon the in-diyidual shar~
holder, but obstructed the state;s industri1l1 deye1opment. (Si>e
criticism in Richardson v. Cra1:g, 11' Ca1.2d 131 [77 P.2d
1077], and in 17 Cal.L.Rev. 276.) It was inevitable that, so
broad a ~iability should come to be sfrictly' limited. Thus, it
was held to be" created"- within the mea,n~:Ilgof section" 359
when the obligation was incurred so that the period of 1imi~
tittions .could run and the creditor ooba:rted_,fr:om auini the
shareholder before his right to SUe, bact ~veli accrued. (H u'7/,~
v. Ward~supra.) This interpret;tti<,>n was ..reaffirmedihan
opinion pointing out that reliance thereoll, ha:d b.een an,im.
portant factor in .the investment. ofmlllions .of' 'donars,)~
thi.s state. (Gardiner v. Royer, 167 Ca1.23~. [139 P.15].)
The hllr$hness of proportional liabillty,,1VaS. m,itigat~d. bY' tl:ii~
construction. When the. constituti~~alproVisi.oi1 'impo~~p.g
t}ils liability wasfihally repealediri .19.30sectio:n>359.~¢I)I!M,
to be. necesSary as Ii limiting restricti~n upon ··~.··litL~ely
broad liability, but itS repeal was. ~p~ateht1y'(i~erlo~~ed;_, ' ;
Whatever the reas6nsof' policy' for the' waf in which IlJec-
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tion 359 has been applied to liabilities created under local
law, the application of that section to a stockholders' liability
created under the laws of another state raises major iss~es
that have been disregarded in the present case as in those
that have preceded it. Without· It clear perception of the
distinction between local and foreign liabilities, it has been
held that section 359 is applicable to the liability of barik
stockholders imposed by other. jurisdictions. (See Royal Trust
00. v. lJfacBcan, 168 Cal. 642 [144 P.139J ; Miller v. Lane,
160 Cal. 90 [116 P. 58J.) The interpretation of section 359
that starts the period l'l1nning from the time the liability iscr.e~
ated rather than when the cause of action accrues, together with
the holdings, made for other purposes, by courts of sister
states that their bank stpckholder's liability is a direct 'and
primary one created at the time the obligation is incnrred,
results in destroying foreign substantive rights before they
are ever actually enforceable.
The Ohio courts have held that under .Ohio law the stockholder's ,liability is created at the time the debt is Incurred
or the deposit is made (State v. Arrowhead Investments, In~.,
10 Ohio Op. 119; Poston v. Httll, 75 Ohio St. 502 [80 N.E. '
11J; Brown v. Hitchcock, 36 Ohio St. 667; Squire v. Abbott,
8 Ohio Op. 134), but this interpretation does not affect the
statute of limitations in that state, for the action there is
not barred until six years after the cause of action accrues.
(National Bank of Lima v. Squire, 3 Ohio Op. 531.) The cause
of action accrues to the creditor 'when the bankfaiIs to' meet
its obligations in the ordinary couJ.'se of business (Sqt~ire v.
Abbott, supra; cf. Brown v. Hitchcock, supra; NationalBank
of Lima v. Squire, supra); it accrues to the superintendent
of banks when he determines that the bank is insolvent.
(National Bank olLima v. Squire, supra; State v. Bremer,
130 Ohio St. 227 [198 N.E. 8741; State v. Weinberger, 44
Ohio App. 264 [185 N.E. 432J ; Feldman v. Standard Trust
Bank, 46 Ohio App. 67 [187 N.E. 743J ; Trustees of Ohio Wesleyan University v. State, 50 Ohio App. 51 [197 N.R 612,
621J). In the present case the Ohio superintendent .of banks
determined that the bank's condition was unso1lnd and took
possession for the purpose of liquidation on June 15, 1933.
On JUly 30, 1934, after aUditing the books of the bank, the
superintendent found that its liabilities exceeded its assets.
He mailed notices to this effect to the stockholders on August
1, 1934, advising them that he intended to enforce their individual liability to the extent of a 100 per cent assessment

to be paid by November 1, 1934. Under Ohio Inw his canse '
of action did not accrue before July 30, 1934, nnd. hIs right
of action in Ohio was not barred until six years from that
date. If, however, the deposits sued lIpon were made oi-the
debts involved were incurred more than three years before
he determined that the bank was insolvent,the application
of section 359 wonld cut off the superintendent's rightt(;sue·
the bank's stockholders in Californiabcfore it aiose and
would thus operate to destroy a forci!:!D substan.tive right
before it was ever actually enforceable. Thisre~;uIt is reached
directly in the case of State of Indiana v. ,Hoffman, 53 Cal;
App.2d 796 [128 P.2d 162], petition for hearing denied by
this court, October 1, 1942, holding that the iiabUity of'
the stockholders is created as soon as the debt is incurred.,
similar determination was avoided in the present ,;caseonly
because the opinion find'! it unnecessary. under the factS-to
go back farther than the date of the bank's failure, more tlirui .
three years before suit was filed.
'.
..
California has no policy necessitating' the de~trnction; ;of
the substantive right of the foreign ban~dep6sitor toeri~.
force the liability imposed upon the bank's Riockholders,anQ.,
no interest in riding over such rights.
In ,fact; its. .polici;f;is
.
, .. \ : . '. ' '
"
.'
to impose such liability, for riot only does it have abai:J"k
act substantially identical with the olJ.i~, statute, but ,thi,~
court has held that, the liability under that a~ds notcr~at~a
until an assessment is made, by the: superintendent of ban'k$';
(Richardson v. Oraig, supra; see, al~o, jokn$onv.G,reene;;.SS
F.21 683, reaching the s~me .concl~sioll; regardit~git:;t~e
NatIOnal Bank Act, from whIch the CahIormaand OhIo'statutes were copied.) It could not have held otherwise.without
vitiating the statutory provisionsrelaHng toa~sessments,.for
an assessment' can rarely be imposed within ihree. Years Of, ,the
creation of the bank's indebtedness. The majority' ophi.ion~
while conceding the right to maintahi actions iIi the courts
·ofthis state to the California superintendent ofha~ks, de~
nies such a right on parallel facts to the Ohlo superintend.eni
and thus vitiates the Ohio statutory provisions relath;tg to
assessments.
'
The opinion ignores the fact that the suits in question
are brought upon a statutory assessment that' would. be fully
recognized and enforced in the Ohio courts, (Squire v. St,an,den, 135 Ohio St. 1 [18 N.E. 608, 120 A.L.R. 952]; State
v. Murley, Blossom & 00., 131 OhiQ St, 2$9 [2 N,E.2d 866] ;
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Vance v. Warner, 129. Ohio St. 357 [195 RE. 704] ; State v.
Cruikshank,51 Ohio App.61 [199 N.E. 611]; Baumgardner
v. State, 48 Ohio App. 5 [192 N.R 349]), and thus gives rise
to an unconstitutional denial of full faith and credit to the
statutes of Ohio and the assessment levied thereUl;lder. (Bradford Elec. L. Co. v. Olapper, 286 U.S. 145 [52 s.m. 571, 76
L.Ed. 1026]; Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 [55 S.Ct.
589, 79 L.Ed. 1100, 100A.L.R 1133] iJohn Hancock jl{utnal
Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.s. 178 [57 s.m. 129, 81 L.Ed .
106] ; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 332, p~ 408; see Lang"
maid, Fnll Faith and Credit Req1lired for Pnblic Acts, (1924)
24 Ill.L.Rev. 383.) An assessment of stockholders' lilibi1it~\
whether made by court order or by an administrative officer
pursuant to statutory authority, is a public act to he accorded
full faith and credit, under the Constitution of the United
States, in the courts of another state. (Broderick v. Rosner,
supra; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 [32 S.Ot. 415,
56 L.Ed. 749].) The defendant stockholder may set up personal defenscs (Ohandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609 [56 S.Ct.
602, 80 L.Ed. 881]), but once the obligation of the stockholders is determined in an assessment proceeding, the existence and amount of the debt and the proportional liability
of each are res jndicata and not snbject to collateral attack
in an action brought in another state to enforce collection
against a non-resident stockholder. (Selig v. Hamilton, 234
U.S. 652 [34 S.Ot. 926, 58 L.Ed. 1518]; Marin v. Angedahl,
247 U.S. 142 [38 S.Ct. 452, 62 L.Ed. 1038] ; Glenn v. Liggett,
135 U.S. 533 [10 S.Ot. 867, 34 L.Ed. 262] ; see Restatement,
Conflict of Laws, § 186, comment c; 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (perm. ed.), § 6522,
p. 953.)
It is unconstitutional to impose as a prerequisite of suit a
condition impossible to fulfill on the pretext of regulating
procedure. (Broderick v. Rosner, supra; Rankin v. Barton,
199 U.S. 228 [26 S.Ot. 29, 50 L.Ed. 163]; Lamb v. Powder
River Live Stock 00., 132 F. 434 [65 C.C.A. 570, 67 L.RA.
558].) In Broderick v. Rosner, snpra, the New York superintendent of banks brought an action in New Jersey to recover on an assessment of the statutory liability of stockholders of an insolvent New York bank. The New Jersey
courts, refusing to allow the action, relied upon the Corporation Act of New Jersey providing' that no action against any
stockholder of a· foreign corporation to enforce the statutory
liability arising under the laws of another state could be
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brought in the courts of New Jersey unless it 'wasin the
nature of an equitable accounting· with. all .sto~k~?lders and
cred itors as necessary parties. The Supreme CClUrt held that
New .Jersey CQuid not deny full faith andcredittothe:Ne~l
Yor!, nss('~sment, since the. New Jersey statute, 'while llom~
in ally affecting the remedy only, imposed ttcondHion iinpossible to fulfill as a· prerequisite. of an .actiqn: to .~nfot;ce .ani
assessment of a sister state and thereforeyiolated the full'
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution•. In
concluding that the assessment was as Jlluchentitled tofuU
faith and credit as if it had been inade bYCQurt order; the
opinion declared: "The fact that .the assessinent here· in
question was made under statutory directiollbyan admin.
istrative officer does not preclude the application of the full
faith and credit clause. If the assessment had been .made
in a liquidation proceeding conducted bya court, New Jer·
sey would have been obliged to enforce it, although the. stockholclers sued had not been made parties to the proceedings.
and, being nonresidents, could not hayc been personally
:wrved with process. (Oonverse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243.
252 [32 RCt. 415, 56 L.Ed. 749].) The reason why in that
case the full faith and credit clause was held to require Wisconsincourts to enforce the assessment made in Minncsota
was not because the determination was embop,ied in ajudgment. Against the nonresident stockholders there had been
no judgment in Minnesota. Wisconsin was required .to eIiforce the .Minnesota assessment because statutes are 'public
acts' within the meaning of the elause."The barring6f
actions in this state before the cause of action ever acc~es
is certainly as drastic as the condition imposed bythc.Ncw
Jersey law held invalid in the foregoing case.
Peters, J. pro tem., concurred.
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